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Abstract
For purposes of this paper, we dene \Personally identi-
able information" (PII) as information which can be used
to distinguish or trace an individual's identity either alone
or when combined with other information that is linkable to
a specic individual. The popularity of Online Social Net-
works (OSN) has accelerated the appearance of vast amounts
of personal information on the Internet. Our research shows
that it is possible for third-parties to link PII, which is leaked
via OSNs, with user actions both within OSN sites and else-
where on non-OSN sites. We refer to this ability to link PII
and combine it with other information as \leakage". We
have identied multiple ways by which such leakage occurs
and discuss measures to prevent it.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Protocols|applications
General Terms
Measurement
Keywords
Online Social Networks, Privacy, Personally Identiable In-
formation
1. INTRODUCTION
For purposes of this paper, \Personally identiable infor-
mation" (PII) is dened as information which can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual's identity either alone or
when combined with other public information that is link-
able to a specic individual. The growth in identity theft
has increased concerns regarding unauthorized disclosure of
PII. Over half a billion people are on various Online Social
Networks (OSNs) and have made available a vast amount
of personal information on these OSNs. OSN users make
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their information available (subject to the privacy policy of
the OSN) to the authorized list of other OSN users, such
as their `friends'. Their proles form a part of their online
identity.
There has been a steady increase in the use of third-
party servers, which provide content and advertisements for
Web pages belonging to rst-party servers. Some third-
party servers are aggregators, which track and aggregate
user viewing habits across dierent rst-party servers, of-
ten via tracking cookies. Earlier, in [6] we showed that a
few third-party tracking servers dominate across a number
of popular Online Social Networks. Subsequently, in [7] we
found that the penetration of the top-10 third-party servers
across a large set of popular Web sites had grown from 40%
in October 2005 to 70% in September 2008. A key question
that has not been examined to our knowledge is whether PII
belonging to any user is being leaked to these third-party
servers via OSNs. Such leakage would imply that third-
parties would not just know the viewing habits of some user,
but would be able to associate these viewing habits with a
specic person.
In this work we have found such leakage to occur and
show how it happens via a combination of HTTP header in-
formation and cookies being sent to third-party aggregators.
We show that most users on OSNs are vulnerable to having
their OSN identity information linked with tracking cook-
ies.
1 Unless an OSN user is aware of this leakage and has
taken preventive measures, it is currently trivial to access
the user's OSN page using the ID information. The two im-
mediate consequences of such leakage: First, since tracking
cookies have been gathered for several years from non-OSN
sites as well, it is now possible for third-party aggregators
to associate identity with those past accesses. Second, since
users on OSNs will continue to visit OSN and non-OSN sites,
such actions in the future are also liable to be linked with
their OSN identity.
Tracking cookies are often opaque strings with hidden se-
mantics known only to the party setting the cookie. As we
also discovered, they may include visible identity informa-
tion and if the same cookie is sent to an aggregator, it would
constitute another vector of leakage. Due to the longer life-
time of tracking cookies, if the identity of the person is estab-
lished even once, then aggregators could internally associate
the cookie with the identity. As the same tracking cookie
is sent from dierent Websites to the aggregator, the user's
1We have shared this information to all the OSNs we studied
so that they may make informed decisions regarding preven-
tative measures and subscriber notication.movements around the Internet can now be tracked not just
as an IP address, but be associated with the unique identi-
er used to store information about users on an OSN. This
OSN identier is a pointer to PII about the user.
Cookies and other tracking mechanisms on the Internet
have been prevalent for a long time. The general claim of
aggregators is that they create proles of users based on
their Internet behavior, but do not gather or record PII. Al-
though we do not know that aggregators are recording PII,
we demonstrate with this work that it is undeniable that
information is available to them. Aggregators do not have
to take any action to receive this information. As part of re-
quests, they receive OSN identiers with pointers to the PII
or in some cases, directly receive pieces of PII. This PII infor-
mation can be joined with information from tracking cookies
obtained from the user's traversal to any site that triggers
a visit to the same aggregator. The ability to link informa-
tion across traversals on the Internet coupled with the wide
range of daily actions performed by hundreds of millions of
users on the Internet raises privacy issues, particularly to
the extent users may not understand the consequences of
having their PII information available to aggregators.
OSNs do have privacy policies on which OSN users rely
when setting up and maintaining their account. These poli-
cies typically state that OSNs provide non-identifying infor-
mation to third-parties as an aid in serving advertisements
and other services. Many users, however may not under-
stand the implications. The availability of a user's OSN
identier allows a third-party access to a user's name and
other linkable PII that can identify a user. The goal of this
work is not a legal examination of privacy policies, but to
bring a technical examination of the observed leakage to the
community's attention.
Section 2 enumerates pieces of personally identiable in-
formation and examines the level of availability for these
pieces across a number of OSNs. Section 3 describes our
study of PII-related leakage in popular OSNs. Section 4
presents ways in which such leakage occurs across OSNs.
Section 5 discusses techniques for possible protection against
such leakage by the various parties involved in the transac-
tions. We then look at preliminary work on the problem of
PII leakage in non-OSN sites in Section 6. Section 7 con-
cludes with a summary and description of future work.
2. AVAILABILITY OF PII IN OSNS
It is important to understand how the information pro-
vided to OSNs corresponds with PII and the nature of avail-
ability of such information to other users. PII is dened
in [5] as referring to \information which can be used to
distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as their
name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone,
or when combined with other personal or identifying infor-
mation which is linked or linkable to a specic individual,
such as date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, etc."
A recent report identies a number of examples that may
be considered PII [9] including: Name (full name, maiden
name, mother's maiden name), personal identication num-
ber (e.g., Social Security Number), address (street or email
address), telephone numbers, or personal characteristics (such
as photographic images especially of face or other distin-
guishing characteristic, X-rays, ngerprints, or other bio-
metric image). They can also include: asset information
(IP or MAC address or a persistent static identier that
consistently links to a particular person or a small, well-
dened group of people), or information identifying person-
ally owned property (vehicle registration or identication
number).
The report also includes examples of information about
an individual that is linked or linkable to one of the above
(e.g., date of birth, place of birth, race, religion, weight,
activities, or employment, medical, education, or nancial
information). A well-known result in linking pieces of PII
is that most Americans (87%) can be uniquely identied
from a birth date, ve-digit zip code, and gender [8]. A
decade-old report [4] by the Federal Trade Commission in
the U.S. specically warned about the potential of linking
proles derived via tracking cookies and information about
consumers obtained oine. It should be stressed that our
work focuses on additional information obtained online.
With this understanding of PII, we analyze its availability
and accessibility in the prole information for OSN users
on popular OSNs. We used the 11 OSNs in our previous
work [6]: Bebo, Digg, Facebook, Friendster, Hi5, Imeem,
LiveJournal, MySpace, Orkut, Twitter and Xanga. We also
included a 12th OSN for this study, LinkedIn, which is a
popular professionals-oriented OSN.
The pieces of PII for an OSN user include: name (rst
and last), location (city), zip code, street address, email ad-
dress, telephone numbers, and photos (both personal and
as a set). We also include pieces of information about an
individual that are linkable to one of the above: gender,
birthday, age or birth year, schools, employer, friends and
activities/interests. We only note availability if users are
specically asked for it as part of their OSN prole; other-
wise we would not expect users to provide it. We do not
process contents of OSN users' pages to see if they have ad-
ditional personal information. Not all prole elements are
lled in by users and entries may of course be false.
Table 1 shows the results of our analysis with the count of
OSNs (out of 12) exhibiting the given degree of availability
for each piece of PII (row). The rst column indicates the
number of OSNs where the piece of PII is available to all
users of the OSN and the user cannot restrict access to it.
This piece may also be available to non-users of the OSN|
thus a primary source of concern. The second column shows
the number of OSNs where the piece of PII is available to
all users in the OSN via the default privacy settings, but the
user can restrict access via these settings. The third column
shows a count of OSNs where there is a piece of PII that
users can ll out in their prole, but by default the value is
not shown to everyone. The fourth column shows the count
of OSNs where a piece of PII is not part of a user's prole
and thus the information is not available unless the user goes
out of their way to add it on their page.
The rows are sorted in decreasing order of availability
and thus leakage (personal photos are available widely while
street address are rarely present). The values in the rst
two columns raise more privacy concerns (hence the dou-
ble vertical line). Prominence is given to them as we found
in [6] that default privacy settings are generally permissive
allowing access to strangers in all OSNs. We also found that
despite privacy controls to limit access, between 55 and 90%
of users in OSNs retain default settings for viewing of prole
information and 80{97% for viewing of friends. The latter
two columns suggests that some OSNs are concerned about
the extent of private information that may be visible onTable 1: PII Availability Counts in 12 OSNs
Level of Availability
Always Available Unavailable Always
Piece of PII Available by default by default Unavailable
Personal Photo 9 2 1 0
Location 5 7 0 0
Gender 4 6 0 2
Name 5 6 1 0
Friends 1 10 1 0
Activities 2 8 0 2
Photo Set 0 9 0 3
Age/Birth Year 2 5 4 1
Schools 0 8 1 3
Employer 0 6 1 5
Birthday 0 4 7 1
Zip Code 0 0 10 2
Email Address 0 0 12 0
Phone Number 0 0 6 6
Street Address 0 0 4 8
OSNs. As we will see later, although some pieces of PII are
unavailable to others in the OSN (the later rows) they may
still leak via other means.
3. LEAKAGE STUDY METHODOLOGY
The concentration and default availability of pieces of PII
for OSNs shown in Table 1 motivates our study to examine
if and how PII is leaked via OSNs. We know that OSNs
use a unique identier for each of their users as a key for
storing information about them. Such an identier can also
appear as part of a URI when user performs various actions
on an OSN. For example, the identier is often shown in the
Request-URI when a user views or edits their OSN prole
or clicks on a friend's picture. The use of this identier is
not a privacy concern if all interactions stay within the OSN,
but as shown in [6] there is also interaction with third-party
servers. If this interaction involves leakage of the unique
identier for a user then the third-party has a pointer to
access PII of the user. The third-party may also have other
information: tracking cookies with a long expiry period or
source IP addresses, to join with the PII.
For the study, we log into each OSN and perform actions,
such as accessing the user prole, that cause the OSN iden-
tier to be displayed as part of the URI. We also click on
displayed ads. While performing these actions we turn on
the \Live HTTP Headers" [14] browser extension in Fire-
fox, which displays HTTP request/response headers for all
object retrievals. We analyze these headers to determine
if any third-party servers are contacted, and if the user's
OSN identier or specic pieces of PII are visibly sent to
the third-party servers via any HTTP header. Note that we
will not detect if this information is sent via opaque strings.
A set of relevant request headers are shown in Figure 1
to illustrate an actual example of such a retrieval. Here
/pagead/test_domain.js is retrieved from the server googleads.
g.doubleclick.net as part of retrieving the set of objects
needed to display content for a page on myspace.com.
2 As
shown, the browser also includes the Referer (sic) header
and a stored cookie belonging to doubleclick.net.
2In all examples, an OSN identier of \123456789" or \jdoe"
is substituted for the actual identier in our study. Cookies
and other strings are also anonymized.
GET /pagead/test_domain.js HTTP/1.1
Host: googleads.g.doubleclick.net
Referer: http://profile.myspace.com/index.cfm?
fuseaction=user.viewprofile&friendid=123456789
Cookie:id=2015bdfb9ec||t=1234359834|et=730|cs=7aepmsks
Figure 1: Sample Leakage of OSN Identier to a
Third-Party
The doubleclick.net server is able to associate the user's
identier MySpace (\friendid" is the label used in URIs by
MySpace to identify users, similar to `id' or `userid' used in
other OSNs) with the DoubleClick cookie. Armed with this
information the aggregator can join its \prole" of user ac-
cesses employing this cookie with any information available
via the MySpace identier.
4. LEAKAGE OF PII
Using the methodology described in Section 3 we exam-
ined the results of actions performed while logged onto each
of the 12 OSNs in our study. We found four types of PII
leakage involving the: 1) transmission of the OSN identier
to third-party servers from the OSN; 2) transmission of the
OSN identier to third-party servers via popular external
applications 3) transmission of specic pieces of PII to third-
party servers; and 4) linking of PII leakage within, across,
and beyond OSNs. We now describe and show specic ex-
amples of how PII is transmitted to third-party aggregators.
4.1 Leakage of OSN Identiﬁer
Our initial focus in the study is on the transmission of
a user's OSN unique identier to a third-party. Based on
results in Table 1 the possession of this identier allows
a third-party to gain much PII information about a OSN
user to join with the third-party prole information about
a user's activity on non-OSN sites. Analyzing the request
headers we obtain via the Live HTTP Headers extension, we
nd that the OSN identier is transmitted to a third-party in
at least three ways: the Referer header, the Request-URI,
or a cookie. Examples for these three types of leakage are
shown in Figure 2. Note that accesses to third-party servers
are often triggered without explicit action (e.g., clicking on
an advertisement) on the user's part.
GET /clk;203330889;26770264;z;u=ds&sv1=170988623...
Host: ad.doubleclick.net
Referer: http://www.facebook.com/profile.php?
id=123456789&ref=name
Cookie: id=2015bdfb9ec||t=1234359834|et=730|cs=7aepmsks
(a) Via Referer Header
GET /__utm.gif?..utmhn=twitter.com&utmp=/profile/jdoe
Host: www.google-analytics.com
Referer: http://twitter.com/jdoe
(b) Via Request-URI
GET ...&g=http%3A//digg.com/users/jdoe&...
Host: z.digg.com
Referer: http://digg.com/users/jdoe
Cookie: s sq=...http%25253A//digg.com/users/jdoe...
(c) Via Cookie
Figure 2: Leakage of OSN ID to a Third-Party
First, OSN identiers can leak via the Referer header of
a request when an identier is part of the URI for a page.OSNs typically include the identier as part of a URI when
showing the contents of any user's prole. As part of loading
the contents for this page, the browser retrieves one or more
objects from a third-party server. Each request contains the
Referer header in the HTTP request, which passes along
the OSN id. Figure 2a shows an example of this leakage
where an object from the third-party ad.doubleclick.net
is retrieved as part of a www.facebook.com page where the
URI contains the OSN id and is thus included in the Referer
header. In addition, the cookie for doubleclick.net is sent
to the third-party server, which can now link this cookie
with the OSN id. In testing, we observed similar examples
of OSN id leakage to a third-party server via the Referer
header in the presence of a third-party cookie for 9 of the
12 OSNs that we studied.
Second, OSN identiers can leak to a third-party server
via the request Request-URI. A typical example is shown
in Figure 2b where a request to the analytics server www.
google-analytics.com is made from a twitter.com page.
This transmission not only allows the third-party to gather
analytic information, but also to know the specic identier
of the user on the OSN. We observed such leakage for 5 of our
12 OSNs. The third-party domain google-analytics.com
occurred in all ve cases.
Third, OSN identiers can leak to a third-party server via
a rst-party cookie when an OSN page contains objects from
a server that appears to be part of the rst-party domain,
but actually belongs to a third-party aggregation server.
We observed the increased use of such \hidden" third-party
servers in [7] and observe similar use for OSNs in this work.
In the example of Figure 2c, when we determine the au-
thoritative DNS server for server z.digg.com we nd that
it is actually a server that is part of omniture.com, a large
third-party tracking company [7]. Thus the browser includes
the rst-party cookie for digg.com in the request, which in-
cludes the OSN id, but the request is actually sent, because
of the DNS mapping, to an omniture.com server. As the ex-
ample shows, the OSN id is also sent via the Request-URI
and Referer header, but this example is notable because
it demonstrates another avenue of id leakage. We observed
leakage of the OSN to such a \hidden" third-party server
via a rst-party cookie for 2 of the 12 OSNs.
In all, we observed the OSN id being leaked to a third-
party server via one of these ways for 11 of the 12 OSNs.
Such leakage allows the third-party to merge the OSN id
with the prole of tracking information maintained by them.
The only OSN for which we did not observe such behav-
ior is Orkut|part of the Google family of domains. Orkut
requires a login via a Google account that is tracked via
a Google cookie thus allowing the Orkut identier to be di-
rectly associated with other google.com activity (e.g., search).
4.2 Leakage Via External Applications
External applications have become increasingly popular;
Facebook alone has over 55,000 external applications. The
applications are installed via the OSN but run on exter-
nal servers not owned or operated by the OSNs themselves.
The user is warned that downloading applications will re-
sult in the OSN sharing user-related information (including
the identier) with the external applications. Such sharing
is required so that application providers can use them in
API calls while interacting with the OSN. The user's social
graph is accessible to the application only via the OSN and
users interact with other OSN users (often their friends) via
the application. Popular gaming applications and social in-
teraction applications take advantage of the social graph to
expand their reach quickly.
We observe that external applications of OSNs may them-
selves leak the OSN identier to third-party aggregators.
Once again, it is unclear if the OSN identier needs to be
made available to the external aggregator. While the leakage
of the identier in such cases is technically not the fault of
the OSN, the user may not be aware of the secondary leakage
occurring through external applications. Examples of leak-
age via requests involving external applications of MySpace
and Facebook are shown in Figure 3.
GET /TLC/...
Host: view.atdmt.com
Referer: http://delb.opt.fimserve.com/
adopt/...&puid=123456789&...
Cookie: AA002=123-456/789;...
(a) Via Referer Header
GET /...&utmhn=www.ilike.com&utmhid=1289997851&
utmr=http://fb.ilike.com/facebook/
auto_playlist_search?name=Bruce+Springsteen&...
fb_sig_user=123456789&...
Host: www.google-analytics.com
Referer: http://www.ilike.com/player?
app=fb&url=http://www.ilike.com/
player/..._artistname/q=Bruce+Springsteen
(b) Via Request-URI
GET /track/?...&fb_sig_time=1236041837.3573&
fb_sig_user=123456789&...
Host: adtracker.socialmedia.com
Referer: http://apps.facebook.com/kick_ass/...
Cookie: fbuserid=123456789;...=blog.socialmedia.com...
cookname=anon; cookid=594...074; bbuserid=...;
(c) Via Request-URI and Cookie
Figure 3: Leakage of OSN ID to a Third-Party From
an External Application
Figure 3a shows an example of a retrieved object from
the third-party server view.atdmt.com with the MySpace
identier included in the Referer header. This retrieval fol-
lows a previous retrieval (not shown) where the use of a
MySpace application causes the OSN identier to be sent
to the third-party server delb.opt.fimserve.com as part
of the Request-URI. The example in Figure 3b shows a
Facebook user's identier being passed on by the popu-
lar external application \iLike" to a third-party aggrega-
tor google-analytics.com via the Request-URI. Figure 3c
shows leakage via the Request-URI and Cookie header via
a dierent application \Kickmania!" to an advertisement
tracker adtracker.socialmedia.com.
4.3 Leakage of Pieces of PII
Beyond our initial focus on leakage of the OSN identier,
we also observe cases where pieces of PII are directly leaked
to third-party servers via the Request-URI, Referer header
and cookies. Figure 4 shows two such examples.
In Figure 4a, the third-party server ads.sixapart.com
is directly given a user's age and gender via the Request-
URI. This request is generated for an object on the user's
prole page. This information is obtained from prole in-
formation stored for the user on livejournal.com. The
third-party server also receives the OSN identier via theGET /show?gender=M&age=29&country=US&language=en...
Host: ads.sixapart.com
Referer: http://jdoe.livejournal.com/profile
(a) Age and Gender Via Request-URI
GET /st?ad_type=iframe&age=29&gender=M&e=&zip=11301&...
Host: ad.hi5.com
Referer: http://www.hi5.com/friend/profile/
displaySameProfile.do?userid=123456789
Cookie: LoginInfo=M_AD_MI_MS|US_0_11301;
Userid=123456789;Email=jdoe@email.com;
(b) Age, Gender, Zip and Email Via Request-URI
and Cookie
Figure 4: Leakage of Pieces of PII to a Third-Party
Referer header, but obtains these two pieces of PII without
even the need for a lookup.
In Figure 4b the server ad.hi5.com appears to be part of
the hi5.com domain, but based on its authoritative DNS, it
is actually served by the third-party domain yieldmanager.
com. This third-party domain not only receives a user's age
and gender, but also the user's zip code. These pieces of PII
are supplied as part of the Request-URI. In addition, the
rst-party cookie for hi5.com contains the user's zip code
and email address. Thus the third-party domain not only
receives four pieces of PII, but the OSN is disclosing PII
about the user that may not even be available to other users
within the OSN. In our study, 2 of the 12 OSNs directly leak
pieces of PII to third-parties via the Request-URI, Referer
header and cookies.
4.4 Linking PII Leakage
Lastly, we examine possible linkages of PII leakage across,
within, and beyond OSNs.
Across OSNs, once a third-party server is leaked PII infor-
mation via one OSN, it may then also be leaked information
via another OSN to which the same user belongs. For exam-
ple, the cookie for doubleclick.net shown in the examples
of Figure 1 and 2a means that DoubleClick can link the PII
from across both MySpace and Facebook. This linkage is
important because it not only allows the aggregator to mine
PII from more than one OSN, but join this PII with the
viewing behavior of this user.
Within an OSN, it is possible for a third-party server to
not only obtain the OSN identier for a user, but also the
identiers for the user's friends and other users of interest
within the OSN. For example, a user viewing a friend's pro-
le will leak that friend's OSN identier.
Finally looking beyond the OSN, the use of a third-party
tracking cookie allows the PII available from the OSN to be
linked with other online user activity. For example, Figure 5
shows a retrieval from a site that a user may not want to be
known to others, yet is linked to the same cookie as used to
access MySpace and Facebook.
GET /pagead/ads?client=ca-primedia-premium_js&...
Host: googleads.g.doubleclick.net
Referer: http://pregnancy.about.com/
Cookie: id=2015bdfb9ec||t=1234359834|et=730|cs=7aepmsks
Figure 5: Example of Third-Party Cookie for Non-
OSN Server
5. PROTECTION AGAINST PII LEAKAGE
We have demonstrated a variety of scenarios whereby OSN
identiers and PII present on the corresponding user pro-
les leak via dierent OSNs. We now examine the parties
involved in the leakage and the ways by which they can help
prevent it. There are primarily four parties involved in the
series of transactions: the user, third-party aggregators, the
OSN, and any external applications accessed via the OSN.
Users ability to block leakage of PII range from the dra-
conian, albeit eective, one of not disclosing any in the rst
place to being highly selective about the type and nature
of personal information shared. Facebook applications have
been created to increase awareness of information that could
be used in security questions [10] and provide mechanisms
for additional privacy protection [11]. Known privacy pro-
tection techniques at the browser include ltering out HTTP
headers (e.g., Referer, Cookie), and refusing third-party
cookies. The potential problem with the Referer header to
leak private information was identied in 1996 (!) in the
HTTP/1.0 specication [2]:
Because the source of a link may be private informa-
tion or may reveal an otherwise private information
source, it is strongly recommended that the user be
able to select whether or not the Referer eld is sent.
Firefox allows direct blocking of Referer header [3] or as
add-on with more per-site control [1]. With user customiza-
tion, some actions may cause further accesses to be aected.
For example, some servers check the Referer header before
they answer any requests, in an attempt to prevent their con-
tent from being linked to or embedded elsewhere. Protection
techniques could be deployed at a proxy [12, 13] to benet
all users behind it. Recently, the HTTP Working Group
has had discussions on new headers (such as the Origin
header) to replace the Referer header.
3 Only the informa-
tion needed for identifying the principal that initiated the
request would be included and path or query portions of the
Request-URI are excluded. The proposal has not advanced
signicantly. Additionally, as we have demonstrated, even
if the user ltered the Referer header and blocked cookies,
the OSN identier is also leaked in the GET or POST request
via the Request-URI.
Second, aggregators could lter out any PII-related head-
ers that arrive at their servers and ensure that tracking
mechanisms are clean of PII at all times. Publishing the hid-
den semantics of cookies could work as a condence building
measure; the current opaque string model implies that users
will not know if dierent cookies received (e.g., after deleting
older cookies) are being correlated.
Third, OSNs could ensure that a wide range of privacy
measures are available to members. Providing strong pri-
vacy protection by default allows an OSN to distinguish it-
self from other competing OSNs. Techniques at OSNs are
in reality much easier. Most leakage identied in this study
originated from the OSN allowing the internal user identi-
er to be visible to the browser unnecessarily leading to the
population of the Referer header. A straightforward solu-
tion is to strip any visible URI of userid information. Alter-
nately the OSN could keep a session-specic value for the
user's identier or maintain an internal hash table of the
ID and present a dynamically generated opaque string to
3Currently available at http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-abarth-origin-00.the browser. If the opaque string is included in the Referer
header by the browser, no information is leaked as the exter-
nal site will not be able to use the opaque string to associate
with the user and thus their PII.
In some cases Facebook inserts a `#' character before the
id eld in its Request-URI. Since some browsers only retain
the portion before `#' in a URI to be used in Referer headers
and such, this may reduce chances of leakage. However, as
our examples have shown, Facebook does not consistently
follow this technique; even when consistently followed, other
(non-Referer header related) leakage mechanisms outlined
will continue to occur.
The fourth party, external applications, allow the OSN
identier to be passed through to external aggregators. They
could use one of the methods outlined above to strip the id
or remap it internally.
6. LEAKAGE VIA NON-OSN SITES
Although we focus on OSNs in this study, it should be
obvious that the manner of leakage could aect users who
have accounts and PII on other sites. Sites related to e-
commerce, travel, and news services, maintain information
about registered users. Some of these sites do use transient
session-specic identiers, which are less prone to identi-
fying an individual compared with persistent identiers of
OSNs. Yet, the sites may embed pieces of PII such as email
addresses and location within cookies or Request-URIs.
We have carried out a preliminary examination of several
popular commercial sites for which we have readily available
access. These include books, newspaper, travel, micropay-
ment, and e-commerce sites. We identied a news site that
leaks user email addresses to at least three separate third-
party aggregators. A travel site embeds a user's rst name
and default airport in its cookies, which is therefore leaked
to any third-party server hiding within the domain name of
the travel site. By and large we did not observe leakage of
user's login identier via the Referer header, the Cookie,
or the Request-URI. It should be noted that even if the
user's identier had leaked, the associated prole informa-
tion about the user will not be available to the aggregator
without the corresponding password.
Our preliminary examination should not be taken as the
nal answer on this issue. A thorough understanding of the
scope of the problem along with steps for preventing leak-
age in general remains a primary concern. Any protection
technique must eectively ensure de-identication between
a user's identity prior to any external communication on any
site that requires logging in|OSN or otherwise.
7. CONCLUSION
The results of our study clearly show that the indirect
leakage of PII via OSN identiers to third-party aggrega-
tion servers is happening. OSNs in our study consistently
demonstrate leakage of user identier information to one or
more third-parties via Request-URIs, Referer headers and
cookies. In addition, two of the OSNs directly leak pieces
of PII to third parties with one of the OSNs leaking zip
code and email information about users that may not be
even publicly available within the OSN itself. We also ob-
serve that this leakage extends to external OSN applications,
which not only have access to user prole information, but
leak a user's OSN identier to other third parties. It should
be noted that there may be private contractual agreements
between aggregators and OSNs that forbid aggregators from
using any information they may receive as a result of user's
interaction with an OSN.
OSNs are in the best position to prevent such leakage by
eliminating OSN identiers from the Request-URI and con-
sequently the Referer header. This elimination can be done
directly or by mapping an OSN identier to a session-specic
value. Users have some means for limiting PII leakage via
what information they provide to the OSN or browser/proxy
techniques to control use of the Referer header and cookies.
However, these controls may break accesses to other sites or
not completely eliminate PII leakage via OSNs.
A clear direction for future work is to understand the big-
ger picture of PII leakage to third parties. We have per-
formed a preliminary examination of PII leakage for non-
OSN sites and found a couple of instances where pieces of
PII were leaked to third-parties. We plan to undertake a
more extensive examination of this issue along with steps
that can be taken to prevent leakage of private information.
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